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every year a weighty and serious investor looks long and with profound respect at Coca…Cola'srecord； but es regretfully to the conclusion that he is looking too late。 The specters of saturation and petition rise before him。〃
先前我曾经提到若是在1919年以40美元投资可口可乐会获得怎样的成果， 1938年在可乐问世达50年且早已成为代表美国的产品之后，财富杂志对该公司做了一次详尽的专访，在文章的第二段作者写到：每年都会有许多重量型的投资人看好可口可乐，并对于其过去的辉煌记录表示敬意，但也都做下自己太晚发现的结论，认为该公司已达巅峰，前方的道路充满了竞争与挑战。
Yes； petition there was in 1938 and in 1993 as well。 But it's worth noting that in 1938 The Coca…Cola Co。 sold 207 million cases of soft drinks （if its gallonage then is converted into the 192…ounce cases used for measurement today） and in 1993 it sold about 10。7 billion cases； a 50…fold increase in physical volume from a pany that in 1938 was already dominant in its very major industry。 Nor was the party over in 1938 for an investor： Though the 40 invested in 1919 in one share had （with dividends reinvested） turned into 3；277 by the end of 1938； a fresh 40 then invested in Coca…Cola stock would have grown to 25；000 by yearend 1993。
没错，1938年确实充满了竞争，而1993年也是，不过值得注意的是1938年可口可乐一年总共卖出二亿箱的饮料（若是将当时加仑装改成现在192盎斯的箱子），但是到了1993年该公司一年卖出饮料高达107亿箱，对这家当时已经成为市场领导者的公司，在后来将近50的期间总共又成长了50倍，对于1938年加入的投资者来说，Party根本还没有结束，虽然在1919年投资40美元在可口可乐股票的投资人（含将所收到的股利再投资），到了1938年可获得3；277美元，但是若是在1938年重新以40美元投资可口可乐股票，时至1993年底，还是照样可以成长到25；000美元。
I can't resist one more quote from that 1938 Fortune story： 〃It would be hard to name any pany parable in size to Coca…Cola and selling； as Coca…Cola does； an unchanged product that can point to a ten…year record anything like Coca…Cola's。〃 In the 55 years that have since passed； Coke's product line has broadened somewhat； but it's remarkable how well that description still fits。
我忍不住想要在引用1938年财富杂志的报导，「实在是很难在找到像可口可乐这样规模而且又能持续十年保持不变的产品内容」，如今又过了55个年头，可口可乐的产品线虽然变得更广泛，但令人印象深刻的是这种形容词还依旧适用。
Charlie and I decided long ago that in an investment lifetime it's just too hard to make hundreds of smart decisions。 That judgment became ever more pelling as Berkshire's capital mushroomed and the universe of investments that could significantly affect our results shrank dramatically。 Therefore； we adopted a strategy that required our being smart … and not too smart at that … only a very few times。 Indeed； we'll now settle for one good idea a year。 （Charlie says it's my turn。）
查理跟我老早以前便明了要一个人的投资生涯中，做出上百个小一点投资决策是件很辛苦的一件事，这种想法随着Berkshire资金规模日益扩大而益形明显，而放眼投资世界中，可以大幅影响本公司投资成效的机会已越来越少，因此我们决定采取一种只要求自己在少数的时候够聪明就好，而不是每回都要非常的聪明，所以我们现在只要求每年出现一次好的投资主意就可以了，（查理提醒我今年该轮到我）。
The strategy we've adopted precludes our following standard diversification dogma。 Many pundits would therefore say the strategy must be riskier than that employed by more conventional investors。 We disagree。 We believe that a policy of portfolio concentration may well decrease risk if it raises； as it should； both the intensity with which an investor thinks about a business and the fort…level he must feel with its economic characteristics before buying into it。 In stating this opinion； we define risk； using dictionary terms； as 〃the possibility of loss or injury。〃
我们采取的这种策略排除了依照普通分散风险的教条，许多学者便会言之凿凿说我们这种策略比起一般传统的投资风险要高的许多，这点我们不敢苟同，我们相信集中持股的做法同样可以大幅降低风险，只要投资人在买进股份之前，能够加强本身对于企业的认知以及对于竞争能力熟悉的程度，在这里我们将风险定义，与一般字典里的一样，系指损失或受伤的可能性。
Academics； however； like to define investment 〃risk〃 differently； averring that it is the relative volatility of a stock or portfolio of stocks … that is； their volatility as pared to that of a large universe of stocks。 Employing data bases and statistical skills； these academics pute with precision the 〃beta〃 of a stock … its relative volatility in the past … and then build arcane investment and capital…allocation theories around this calculation。 In their hunger for a single statistic to measure risk； however； they forget a fundamental principle： It is better to be approximately right than precisely wrong。
然而在学术界，却喜欢将投资的风险给予不同的定义，坚持把它当作是股票价格相对波动的程度，也就是个别投资相较于全体投资波动的幅度，运用数据库与统计方法，这些学者能够计算出一只股票〃精确〃的Beta值，代表其过去相对波动的幅度，然后根据这项公式建立一套晦涩难解的投资与资金分配理论，为了渴望找出可以衡量风险的单一统计值，但他们却忘了一项基本的原则，宁愿大概对，也不要完全错。
For owners of a business … and that's the way we think of shareholders … the academics' definition of risk is far off the mark； so much so that it produces absurdities。 For example； under beta…based theory； a stock that has dropped very sharply pared to the market … as had Washington Post when we bought it in 1973 … bees 〃riskier〃 at the lower price than it was at the higher price。 Would that description have then made any sense to someone who was offered the entire pany at a vastly…reduced price？
对于企业的所有权人来说，这是我们认为公司股东应该有的想法，学术界对于风险的定义实在是有点离谱，甚至于有点荒谬，举例来说，根据Beta理论，若是有一种股票的价格相对于大盘下跌的幅度更高，就像是我们在1973年买进华盛顿邮报股份时一样，那么其风险远比原来高股价时还要更高，那么要是哪天有人愿意以极低的价格把整家公司卖给你时，你是否也会认为这样的风险太高，而予以拒绝呢？
In fact； the true investor weles volatility。 Ben Graham explained why in Chapter 8 of The Intelligent Investor。 There he introduced 〃Mr。 Market；〃 an obliging fellow who shows up every day to either buy from you or sell to you； whichever you wish。 The more manic…depressive this chap is； the greater the opportunities available to the investor。 That's true because a wildly fluctuating market means that irrationally low prices will periodically be attached to solid businesses。 It is impossible to see how the availability of such prices can be thought of as increasing the hazards for an investor who is totally free to either ignore the market or exploit its folly。
事实上，真正的投资人喜欢波动都还来不及，班哲明．葛拉汉在智能型投资人一书的第八章便有所解释，他引用了市场先生理论，市场先生每天都会出现在你面前，只要你愿意都可以从他那里买进或卖出你的投资，只要他老兄越沮丧，投资人拥有的机会也就越多，这是由于只要市场波动的幅度越大，一些超低的价格就更有机会会出现在一些好公司身上，很难想象这种低价的优惠会被投资人视为对其有害，对于投资人来说，你完全可以无视于他的存在或是好好地利用这种愚蠢的行为。
In assessing risk； a beta purist will disdain examining what a pany produces； what its petitors are doing； or how much borrowed money the business employs。 He may even prefer not to know the pany's name。 What he treasures is the price history of its stock。 In contrast； we'll happily forgo knowing the price history and instead will seek whatever information will further our understanding of the pany's business。 After we buy a stock； consequently； we would not be disturbed if markets closed for a year or two。 We don't need a daily quote on our 100％ position in See's or H。 H。 Brown to validate our well…being。 Why； then； should we need a quote on our 7％ interest in Coke？
在评估风险时，Beta理论学者根本就不屑于了解这家公司到底是在做什么，他的竞争对手在干嘛，或是他们到底借了多少钱来营运，他们甚至不愿意知道公司的名字叫什么，他们在乎的只是这家公司的历史股价，相对地，我们很愿意不管这家公司过去股价的历史，反而希望尽量能够得到有助于我们了解这家公司的资讯，另外在我们买进股份之后，我们一点也不在意这家公司的股份在未来的一、两年内是否有交易，就像是我们根本就不需要持有100％股权的喜斯糖果或是布朗鞋业的股票报价来证明我们的权益是否存在，同样地我们也不需要持有7％的可口可乐每日的股票行情。
In our opinion； the real risk that an investor must assess is whether his aggregate after…tax receipts from an investment （including