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，估计可能要缴的所得税。虽然没有任何一项数字是完美的，但我们相信这项透视盈余会比按一般公认会计原则下的数字更能够反应Berkshire实际的获利状况。
I've told you that over time look…through earnings must increase at about 15％ annually if our intrinsic business value is to grow at that rate。 Our look…through earnings in 1992 were 604 million； and they will need to grow to more than 1。8 billion by the year 2000 if we are to meet that 15％ goal。 For us to get there； our operating subsidiaries and investees must deliver excellent performances； and we must exercise some skill in capital allocation as well。
我曾经告诉各位，长期而言，如果我们的实质价值也期望以这个幅度来成长的话，透视盈余每年也必须增加15％，1992年我们的透视盈余约为6。04亿美元，而到公元2000年为止，若要以15％的目标，透视盈余必须成长到18亿美元，要完成这样的目标，代表我们旗下的营运事业及主要的被投资公司必须要有更杰出的表现，同时我们本身资金规划分配也要更有效益才成。
We cannot promise to achieve the 1。8 billion target。 Indeed； we may not even e close to it。 But it does guide our decision…making： When we allocate capital today； we are thinking about what will maximize look…through earnings in 2000。
我们不敢保证届时一定可以达到18亿美元的目标，甚至很有可能根本就达不到，不过这目标还是对我们的决策有帮助，每当我们现在在分配资金时，我们都会想到要如何将2000年的透视盈余极大化。
We do not； however； see this long…term focus as eliminating the need for us to achieve decent short…term results as well。 After all； we were thinking long…range thoughts five or ten years ago； and the moves we made then should now be paying off。 If plantings made confidently are repeatedly followed by disappointing harvests； something is wrong with the farmer。 （Or perhaps with the farm： Investors should understand that for certain panies； and even for some industries； there simply is no good long…term strategy。） Just as you should be suspicious of managers who pump up short…term earnings by accounting maneuvers； asset sales and the like； so also should you be suspicious of those managers who fail to deliver for extended periods and blame it on their long…term focus。 （Even Alice； after listening to the Queen lecture her about 〃jam tomorrow；〃 finally insisted； 〃It must e sometimes to jam today。〃）
不过我们对于长期目标的专注并不代表我们就不注重短期结果，总的来说我们早在5到10年前就预先规划设想，而当时所作的举动现在才开始慢慢地回收，如果每次有信心的播种最后的收割结果都一再让人失望的话，农夫就应该要好好地检讨原因了，（不然就是农地有问题，投资人必须了解对于某些公司或甚至是某些产业，根本就没有所谓的长期性策略），就像是你可能会特别留心那些利用会计手法或出售资产撑高短期盈余的经理人，你也应该要特别注意那些一再延长达成目标期程，并把长期目标一直挂在嘴上的人，（即使是爱莉丝一再听到母后明天再挤牛奶的说教，她最后还是忍不注坚持，总有一些应该要今天挤吧！）
The following table shows you how we calculate look…through earnings； though I warn you that the figures are necessarily very rough。 （The dividends paid to us by these investees have been included in the operating earnings itemized on page 8； mostly under 〃Insurance Group： Net Investment Ine。〃）
各位可以从下表看出我们是如何计算透视盈余的，不过我还是要提醒各位这些数字有点粗糙，（被投资公司所分配的股利收入已经包含在保险事业的净投资收益项下）
Berkshire's Share of Undistributed
Berkshire's Approximate Operating Earnings
Berkshire's Major Investees Ownership at Yearend （in millions）
Capital Cities/ABC Inc。 The Coca…Cola pany Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp。 GEICO Corp General Dynamics Corp。 The Gillette pany Guinness PLC The Washington Post pany Wells Fargo & pany
1992 18。2％ 7。1％ 8。2％（1） 48。1％ 14。1％ 10。9％ 2。0％ 14。6％ 11。5％
1991 18。1％ 7。0％ 3。4％（1） 48。2％ 11。0％ 1。6％ 14。6％ 9。6％
1992 70 82 29（2） 34（3） 11（2） 38 7 11 16（2）
1991 61 69 15 69（3） 23（2） 10 （17）（2）
Berkshire's share of undistributed earnings of major investees Hypothetical tax on these undistributed investee earnings Reported operating earnings of Berkshire Total look…through earnings of Berkshire
1992 298 （42） 348 604
1991 230 （30） 316 516
（1） Net of minority interest at Wesco已扣除Wesco的少数股权
（2） Calculated on average ownership for the year以年平均持有股权比例计算
（3） Excludes realized capital gains； which have been both recurring and significant扣除重复发生且金额大的已实现资本利得，
Insurance Operations保险事业营运
Shown below is an updated version of our usual table presenting key figures for the property…casualty insurance industry：
下表是产物意外险业的最新的几项重要指数
Yearly Change bined Ratio in Premiums After Policyholder
Written （％） Dividends
1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 （Revised） 1992 （Est。）
3。8 3。7 5。0 8。5 22。1 22。2 9。4 4。5 3。2 4。5 2。4 2。7
106。0 109。6 112。0 118。0 116。3 108。0 104。6 105。4 109。2 109。6 108。8 114。8
The bined ratio represents total insurance costs （losses incurred plus expenses） pared to revenue from premiums： A ratio below 100 indicates an underwriting profit； and one above 100 indicates a loss。 The higher the ratio； the worse the year。 When the investment ine that an insurer earns from holding policyholders' funds （〃the float〃） is taken into account； a bined ratio in the 106 … 110 range typically produces an overall break…even result； exclusive of earnings on the funds provided by shareholders。
综合比率代表保险的总成本（理赔损失加上费用）占保费收入的比例，比率在100以下代表有承保的损失，在100以上则代表有承保的获利综合比率代表的是保险的总成本（损失加上费用）占保费收入的比率，100以下代表会有承销利益，100以上代表会有承销损失，若把持有保费收入浮存金（扣除股东权益部份所产生的盈余）所产生的投资收益列入考量，损益两平的范围大概是在106…110之间。
About four points in the industry's 1992 bined ratio can be attributed to Hurricane Andrew； which caused the largest insured loss in history。 Andrew destroyed a few small insurers。 Beyond that； it awakened some larger panies to the fact that their reinsurance protection against catastrophes was far from adequate。 （It's only when the tide goes out that you learn who's been swimming naked。） One major insurer escaped insolvency solely because it had a wealthy parent that could promptly supply a massive transfusion of capital。
1992年的综合比率由于史上最大的单一损失理赔事件…Andrew 飓风发生而多增加了4个百分点，Andrew让几家小型保险公司因此倒闭，另外他也让许多大型保险公司发觉自己并未寻求到足够的再保险保护，（只有当浪退了，大家才知道是谁没穿衣服还在游泳的），还有一家大型的保险公司要不是因为背后有个有钱的母公司及时供应资金的话，可能早就已经关门大吉了。
Bad as it was； however； Andrew could easily have been far more damaging if it had hit Florida 20 or 30 miles north of where it actually did and had hit Louisiana further east than was the case。 All in all； many panies will rethink their reinsurance programs in light of the Andrew experience。
坏归坏，还好Andrew没有往北20…30英哩侵袭到佛罗里达，或是往东侵袭到路易西安那州，否则损失可能难以估计，总而言之，很多公司因为Andrew事件可能会重新考虑现有的再保险安排是否适当。
As you know we are a large writer … perhaps the largest in the world … of 〃super…cat〃 coverages； which are the policies that other insurance panies buy to protect themselves against major catastrophic losses。 Consequently； we too took our lumps from Andrew； suffering losses from it of about 125 million； an amount roughly equal to our 1992 super…cat premium ine。 Our other super…cat losses； though； were negligible。 This line of business therefore produced an overall loss of only 2 million for the year。 （In addition； our investee； GEICO； suffered a net loss from Andrew； after reinsurance recoveries and tax savings； of about 50 million； of which our share is roughly 25 million。 This loss did not affect our operating earnings； but did reduce our look…through earnings。）
大家知道Berkshire一直都是霹雳猫保单相当大的发行公司，或许规模已是全世界最大的，这类保单通常是由其它保险公司买来分散他们本身在重大意外事故所需承担的风险，也因此我们必须承受一大块Andrew所造成的损失，金额约为1。25亿美元，这数字相当于我们一整年的保费收入，不过还好其它霹雳猫保单实际发生的损失都相当轻微，所以结算下来全年的总损失只有200万美元，（另外我们的被投资公司GEICO也因Andrew飓风产生了一些损失，在扣除再保分摊与税负抵减之后，金额约为5；000万美元，依我们的持股比例大概要分摊2；500万美元，虽然这项损失不会反应在我们的帐上，但确实已对我们的透视盈余造成影响）。
In