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imperfection in me）； I answer that they depend on a
bination of two causes； to wit； on the faculty of knowledge
that rests in me； and on the power of choice or of free
will￥that is to say； of the understanding and at the same time
of the will。 For by the understanding alone I ＇neither assert
nor deny anything； but＇ apprehend19 the ideas of things as to
which I can form a judgment。 But no error is properly
speaking found in it； provided the word error is taken in its
proper signification； and though there is possibly an
infinitude of things in the world of which I have no idea in
my understanding； we cannot for all that say that it is
deprived of these ideas ＇as we might say of something which is
required by its nature＇； but simply it does not possess these；
because in truth there is no reason to prove that God should
have given me a greater faculty of knowledge than He has given
me； and however skillful a workman I represent Him to be； I
should not for all that consider that He was bound to have
placed in each of His works all the perfections which He may
have been able to place in some。 I likewise cannot plain
that God has not given me a free choice or a will which is
sufficient； ample and perfect； since as a matter of fact I am
conscious of a will so extended as to be subject to no limits。
And what seems to me very remarkable in this regard is that of
all the qualities which I possess there is no one so perfect
and so prehensive that I do not very clearly recognise that
it might be yet greater and more perfect。 For； to take an
example； if I consider the faculty of prehension which I
possess； I find that it is of very small extent and extremely
limited； and at the same time I find the idea of another
faculty much more ample and even infinite； and seeing that I
can form the idea of it； I recognise from this very fact that
it pertains to the nature of God。 If in the same way I
examine the memory； the imagination； or some other faculty； I
do not find any which is not small and circumscribed； while in
God it is immense ＇or infinite＇。 It is free…will alone or
liberty of choice which I find to be so great in me that I can
conceive no other idea to be more great； it is indeed the case
that it is for the most part this will that causes me to know
that in some manner I bear the image and similitude of God。
For although the power of will is inparably greater in God
than in me； both by reason of the knowledge and the power
which； conjoined with it； render it stronger and more
efficacious； and by reason of its object； inasmuch as in God
it extends to a great many things； it nevertheless does not
seem to me greater if I consider it formally and precisely in
itself： for the faculty of will consists alone in our having
the power of choosing to do a thing or choosing not to do it
（that is； to affirm or deny； to pursue or to shun it）； or
rather it consists alone in the fact that in order to affirm
or deny； pursue or shun those things placed before us by the
understanding； we act so that we are unconscious that any
outside force constrains us in doing so。 For in order that I
should be free it is not necessary that I should be
indifferent as to the choice of one or the other of two
contraries； but contrariwise the more I lean to the
one￥whether I recognise clearly that the reasons of the good
and true are to be found in it； or whether God so disposes my
inward thought￥the more freely do I choose and embrace it。
And undoubtedly both divine grace and natural knowledge； far
from diminishing my liberty； rather increase it and strengthen
it。 Hence this indifference which I feel； when I am not
swayed to one side rather than to the other by lack of reason；
is the lowest grade of liberty； and rather evinces a lack or
negation in knowledge than a perfection of will： for if I
always recognised clearly what was true and good； I should
never have trouble in deliberating as to what judgment or
choice I should make； and then I should be entirely free
without ever being indifferent。
From all this I recognise that the power of will which I
have received from God is not of itself the source of my
errors￥for it is very ample and very perfect of its kind￥any
more than is the power of understanding； for since I
understand nothing but by the power which God has given me for
understanding； there is no doubt that all that I understand； I
understand as I ought； and it is not possible that I err in
this。 Whence then e my errors？ They e from the sole
fact that since the will is much wider in its range and
pass than the understanding； I do not restrain it within
the same bounds； but extend it also to things which I do not
understand： and as the will is of itself indifferent to
these； it easily falls into error and sin； and chooses the
evil for the good； or the false for the true。
For example； when I lately examined whether anything
existed in the world； and found that from the very fact that I
considered this question it followed very clearly that I
myself existed； I could not prevent myself from believing that
a thing I so clearly conceived was true： not that I found
myself pelled to do so by some external cause； but simply
because from great clearness in my mind there followed a great
inclination of my will； and I believed this with so much the
greater freedom or spontaneity as I possessed the less
indifference towards it。 Now； on the contrary； I not only
know that I exist； inasmuch as I am a thinking thing； but a
certain representation of corporeal nature is also presented
to my mind； and it es to pass that I doubt whether this
thinking nature which is in me； or rather by which I am what I
am； differs from this corporeal nature； or whether both are
not simply the same thing； and I here suppose that I do not
yet know any reason to persuade me to adopt the one belief
rather than the other。 From this it follows that I am
entirely indifferent as to which of the two I affirm or deny；
or even whether I abstain from forming any judgment in the
matter。
And this indifference does not only extend to matters as
to which the understanding has no knowledge； but also in
general to all those which are not apprehended with perfect
clearness at the moment when the will is deliberating upon
them： for； however probable are the conjectures which render
me disposed to form a judgment respecting anything； the simple
knowledge that I have that those are conjectures alone and not
certain and indubitable reasons； suffices to occasion me to
judge the contrary。 Of this I have had great experience of
late when I set aside as false all that I had formerly held to
be absolutely true； for the sole reason that I remarked that
it might in some measure be doubted。
But if I abstain from giving my judgment on any thing
when I do not perceive it with sufficient clearness and
distinctness； it is plain that I act rightly and am not
deceived。 But if I determine to deny or affirm； I no longer
make use as I should of my free will； and if I affirm what is
not true； it is evident that I deceive myself； even though I
judge according to truth； this es about only by chance； and
I do not escape the blame of misusing my freedom； for the
light of nature teaches us that the knowledge of the
understanding should always precede the determination of the
will。 And it is in the misuse of the free will that the
privation which constitutes the characteristic nature of error
is met with。 Privation； I say； is found in the act； in so far
as it proceeds from me； but it is not found in the faculty
which I have received from God； nor even in the act in so far
as it depends on Him。
For I have certainly no cause to plain that God has
not given me an intelligence which is more powerful； or a
natural light which is stronger than that which I have
received from Him； since it is proper to the finite
understanding not to prehend a multitude of things； and it
is proper to a created understanding to be finite； on the
contrary； I have every reason to render thanks to God who owes
me nothing and who has given me all the perfections I possess；
and I should be far