按键盘上方向键 ← 或 → 可快速上下翻页，按键盘上的 Enter 键可回到本书目录页，按键盘上方向键 ↑ 可回到本页顶部！
————未阅读完？加入书签已便下次继续阅读！
are good or not according to the discrimination of the prince。 And the
first opinion which one forms of a prince； and of his understanding； is
by observing the men he has around him； and when they are capable and
faithful he may always be considered wise； because he has known how to
recognize the capable and to keep them faithful。 But when they are
otherwise one cannot form a good opinion of him； for the prime error
which he made was in choosing them。
There were none who knew Messer Antonio da Venafro as the servant of
Pandolfo Petrucci； Prince of Siena； who would not consider Pandolfo to
be a very clever man in having Venafro for his servant。 Because there
are three classes of intellects： one which prehends by itself；
another which appreciates what others prehend； and a third which
neither prehends by itself nor by the showing of others； the first is
the most excellent； the second is good； the third is useless。 Therefore；
it follows necessarily that； if Pandolfo was not in the first rank； he
was in the second； for whenever one has judgment to know good or bad
when it is said and done； although he himself may not have the
initiative； yet he can recognize the good and the bad in his servant；
and the one he can praise and the other correct； thus the servant cannot
hope to deceive him； and is kept honest。
But to enable a prince to form an opinion of his servant there is one
test which never falls； when you see the servant thinking more of his
own interests than of yours； and seeking inwardly his own profit in
everything； such a man will never make a good servant； nor will you ever
be able to trust him； because he who has the state of another in his
hands ought never to think of himself； but always of his prince； and
never pay any attention to matters in which the prince is not concerned。
On the other to keep his servant honest the prince ought to study him；
honouring him； enriching him； doing him kindnesses； sharing with him the
honours and cares； and at the same time let him see that he cannot stand
alone； so that many honours not make him desire more； many riches make
him wish for more； and that many cares may make him dread changes。 When；
therefore； servants； and princes towards servants； are thus disposed；
they can trust each other； but when it is otherwise； the end will always
be disastrous for either one or the other。
CHAPTER XXIII
HOW FLATTERERS SHOULD BE AVOIDED
I DO NOT wish to leave out an important branch of this subject； for it
is a danger from which princes are with difficulty preserved； unless
they are very careful and discriminating。 It is that of flatterers； of
whom courts arc full； because men are so self…placent in their own
affairs； and in a way so deceived in them； that they are preserved with
difficulty from this pest； and if they wish to defend themselves they
run the danger of falling into contempt。 Because there is no other way
of guarding oneself from flatterers except letting men understand that
to tell you the truth does not offend you； but when every one may tell
you the truth； respect for you abates。
Therefore a wise prince ought to hold a third course by choosing the
wise men in his state； and giving to them only the liberty of speaking
the truth to him； and then only of those things of which he inquires；
and of none others； but he ought to question them upon everything； and
listen to their opinions； and afterwards form his own conclusions。 With
these councillors； separately and collectively； he ought to carry
himself in such a way that each of them should know that； the more
freely he shall speak； the more he shall be preferred； outside of these；
he should listen to no one； pursue the thing resolved on； and be
steadfast in his resolutions。 He who does otherwise is either overthrown
by flatterers； or is so often changed by varying opinions that he falls
into contempt。
I wish on this subject to adduce a modern example。 Fra Luca； the man of
affairs to Maximilian； the present emperor； speaking of his majesty；
said： He consulted with no one； yet never got his own way in anything。
This arose because of his following a practice the opposite to the
above； for the emperor is a secretive man he does not municate his
designs to any one； nor does he receive opinions on them。 But as in
carrying them into effect they bee revealed and known； they are at
once obstructed by those men whom he has around him； and he； being
pliant； is diverted from them。 Hence it follows that those things he
does one day he undoes the next； and no one ever understands what he
wishes or intends to do； and no one can rely on his resolutions。
A prince； therefore； ought always to take counsel； but only when he
wishes and not when others wish； he ought rather to discourage every one
from offering advice unless he asks it； but； however； he ought to be a
constant inquirer； and afterwards a patient listener concerning the
things of which he inquired； also； on learning that any one； on any
consideration； has not told him the truth； he should let his anger be
felt。
And if there are some who think that a prince who conveys an impression
of his wisdom is not so through his own ability； but through the good
advisers that he has around him； beyond doubt they are deceived； because
this is an axiom which never fails： that a prince who is not wise
himself will never take good advice； unless by chance he has yielded his
affairs entirely to one person who happens to be a very prudent man。 In
this case indeed he may be well governed； but it would not be for long；
because such a governor would in a short time take away his state from
him。
But if a prince who is not experienced should take counsel from more
than one he will never get united counsels； nor will he know how to
unite them。 Each of the counsellors will think of his own interests； and
the prince will not know how to control them or to see through them。 And
they are not to be found otherwise； because men will always prove untrue
to you unless they are kept honest by constraint。 Therefore it must be
inferred that good counsels； whencesoever they e； are born of the
wisdom of the prince； and not the wisdom of the prince from good
counsels。
CHAPTER XXIV
THE PRINCES OF ITALY HAVE LOST THEIR STATES
THE previous suggestions； carefully observed； will enable a new prince
to appear well established； and render him at once more secure and fixed
in the state than if he had been long seated there。 For the actions of a
new prince are more narrowly observed than those of an hereditary one；
and when they are seen to be able they gain more men and bind far
tighter than ancient blood； because men are attracted more by the
present than by the past； and when they find the present good they enjoy
it and seek no further； they will also make the utmost defence for a
prince if he fails them not in other things。 Thus it will be a double
glory to him to have established a new principality； and adorned and
strengthened it with good laws； good arms； good allies； and with a good
example； so will it be a double disgrace to him who； born a prince；
shall lose his state by want of wisdom。
And if those seigniors are considered who have lost their states in
Italy in our times； such as the King of Naples； the Duke of Milan； and
others； there will be found in them； firstly； one mon defect in
regard to arms from the causes which have been discussed at length； in
the next place； some one of them will be seen； either to have had the
people hostile； or if he has had the people friendly； he has not known
how to secure the nobles。 In the absence of these defects states that
have power enough to keep an army in the field cannot be lost。
Philip of Macedon； not the father of Alexander the Great； but he who was
conquered by Titus Quintius； had not much territory pared to the
greatness of the Romans and of Greece who attacked him； ye