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But ＇were I independent of every other and＇ were I myself
the author of my being； I should doubt nothing and I should
desire nothing； and finally no perfection would be lacking to
me； for I should have bestowed on myself every perfection of
which I possessed any idea and should thus be God。 And it
must not be imagined that those things that are lacking to me
are perhaps more difficult of attainment than those which I
already possess； for； on the contrary； it is quite evident
that it was a matter of much greater difficulty to bring to
pass that I； that is to say； a thing or a substance that
thinks； should emerge out of nothing； than it would be to
attain to the knowledge of many things of which I am ignorant；
and which are only the accidents of this thinking substance。
But it is clear that if I had of myself possessed this greater
perfection of which I have just spoken ＇that is to say； if I
had been the author of my own existence＇； I should not at
least have denied myself the things which are the more easy to
acquire ＇to wit； many branches of knowledge of which my nature
is destitute＇； nor should I have deprived myself of any of the
things contained in the idea which I form of God； because
there are none of them which seem to me specially difficult to
acquire： and if there were any that were more difficult to
acquire； they would certainly appear to me to be such
（supposing I myself were the origin of the other things which
I possess） since I should discover in them that my powers were
limited。
But though I assume that perhaps I have always existed
just as I am at present； neither can I escape the force of
this reasoning； and imagine that the conclusion to be drawn
from this is； that I need not seek for any author of my
existence。 For all the course of my life may be divided into
an infinite number of parts； none of which is in any way
dependent on the other； and thus from the fact that I was in
existence a short time ago it does not follow that I must be
in existence now； unless some cause at this instant； so to
speak； produces me anew； that is to say； conserves me。 It is
as a matter of fact perfectly clear and evident to all those
who consider with attention the nature of time； that； in order
to be conserved in each moment in which it endures； a
substance has need of the same power and action as would be
necessary to produce and create it anew； supposing it did not
yet exist； so that the light of nature shows us clearly that
the distinction between creation and conservation is solely a
distinction of the reason。
All that I thus require here is that I should interrogate
myself； if I wish to know whether I possess a power which is
capable of bringing it to pass that I who now am shall still
be in the future； for since I am nothing but a thinking thing；
or at least since thus far it is only this portion of myself
which is precisely in question at present； if such a power did
reside in me； I should certainly be conscious of it。 But I am
conscious of nothing of the kind； and by this I know clearly
that I depend on some being different from myself。
Possibly； however； this being on which I depend is not
that which I call God； and I am created either by my parents
or by some other cause less perfect than God。 This cannot be；
because； as I have just said； it is perfectly evident that
there must be at least as much reality in the cause as in the
effect； and thus since I am a thinking thing； and possess an
idea of God within me； whatever in the end be the cause
assigned to my existence； it must be allowed that it is
likewise a thinking thing and that it possesses in itself the
idea of all the perfections which I attribute to God。 We may
again inquire whether this cause derives its origin from
itself or from some other thing。 For if from itself； it
follows by the reasons before brought forward； that this cause
must itself be God； for since it possesses the virtue of self…
existence； it must also without doubt have the power of
actually possessing all the perfections of which it has the
idea； that is； all those which I conceive as existing in God。
But if it derives its existence from some other cause than
itself； we shall again ask； for the same reason； whether this
second cause exists by itself or through another； until from
one step to another； we finally arrive at an ultimate cause；
which will be God。
And it is perfectly manifest that in this there can be no
regression into infinity； since what is in question is not so
much the cause which formerly created me； as that which
conserves me at the present time。
Nor can we suppose that several causes may have concurred
in my production； and that from one I have received the idea
of one of the perfections which I attribute to God； and from
another the idea of some other； so that all these perfections
indeed exist somewhere in the universe； but not as plete in
one unity which is God。 On the contrary； the unity； the
simplicity or the inseparability of all things which are in
god is one of the principal perfections which I conceive to be
in Him。 And certainly the idea of this unity of all Divine
perfections cannot have been placed in me by any cause from
which I have not likewise received the ideas of all the other
perfections； for this cause could not make me able to
prehend them as joined together in an inseparable unity
without having at the same time caused me in some measure to
know what they are ＇and in some way to recognise each one of
them＇。
Finally； so far as my parents ＇from whom it appears I
have sprung＇ are concerned； although all that I have ever been
able to believe of them were true； that does not make it
follow that it is they who conserve me； nor are they even the
authors of my being in any sense； in so far as I am a thinking
being； since what they did was merely to implant certain
dispositions in that matter in which the self￥i。e。 the mind；
which alone I at present identify with myself￥is by me deemed
to exist。 And thus there can be no difficulty in their
regard； but we must of necessity conclude from the fact alone
that I exist； or that the idea of a Being supremely
perfect￥that is of God￥is in me； that the proof of God's
existence is grounded on the highest evidence。
It only remains to me to examine into the manner in which
I have acquired this idea from God； for I have not received it
through the senses； and it is never presented to me
unexpectedly； as is usual with the ideas of sensible things
when these things present themselves； or seem to present
themselves； to the external organs of my senses； nor is it
likewise a fiction of my mind； for it is not in my power to
take from or to add anything to it； and consequently the only
alternative is that it is innate in me； just as the idea of
myself is innate in me。
And one certainly ought not to find it strange that God；
in creating me； placed this idea within me to be like the mark
of the workman imprinted on his work； and it is likewise not
essential that the mark shall be something different from the
work itself。 For from the sole fact that God created me it is
most probable that in some way he has placed his image and
similitude upon me； and that I perceive this similitude （in
which the idea of God is contained） by means of the same
faculty by which I perceive myself￥that is to say； when I
reflect on myself I not only know that I am something
＇imperfect＇； inplete and dependent on another； which
incessantly aspires after something which is better and
greater than myself； but I also know that He on whom I depend
possesses in Himself all the great things towards which I
aspire ＇and the ideas of which I find within myself＇； and that
not indefinitely or potentially alone； but really； actually
and infinitely； and that thus He is God。 And the whole
strength of the argument which I have here made use of to
prove the existence of God consists in this； that I recognise
that it is not possible that my nature should be what it is；
and indeed that I should have in myself the idea of a God； if
God did not veritably exist￥a God； I say； whose idea is