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in troubled times； can destroy the government with great ease； either by
intrigue or open defiance； and the prince has not the chance amid
tumults to exercise absolute authority； because the citizens and
subjects； accustomed to receive orders from magistrates； are not of a
mind to obey him amid these confusions； and there will always be in
doubtful times a scarcity of men whom he can trust。 For such a prince
cannot rely upon what he observes in quiet times； when citizens had need
of the state； because then every one agrees with him； they all promise；
and when death is far distant they all wish to die for him； but in
troubled times； when the state has need of its citizens； then he finds
but few。 And so much the more is this experiment dangerous； inasmuch as
it can only be tried once。 Therefore a wise prince ought to adopt such a
course that his citizens will always in every sort and kind of
circumstance have need of the state and of him； and then he will always
find them faithful。
CHAPTER X
CONCERNING THE WAY IN WHICH THE STRENGTH OF ALL PRINCIPALITIES OUGHT TO
BE MEASURED
IT IS necessary to consider another point in examining the character of
these principalities： that is； whether a prince has such power that； in
case of need； he can support himself with his own resources； or whether
he has always need of the assistance of others。 And to make this quite
clear I say that I consider those are able to support themselves by
their own resources who can； either by abundance of men or money； raise
a sufficient army to join battle against any one who es to attack
them； and I consider those always to have need of others who cannot show
themselves against the enemy in the field； but are forced to defend
themselves by sheltering behind walls。 The first case has been
discussed； but we will speak of it again should it recur。 In the second
case one can say nothing except to encourage such princes to provision
and fortify their towns； and not on any account to defend the country。
And whoever shall fortify his town well； and shall have managed the
other concerns of his subjects in the way stated above； and to be often
repeated； will never be attacked without great caution； for men are
always adverse to enterprises where difficulties can be seen； and it
will be seen not to be an easy thing to attack one who has his town well
fortified； and is not hated by his people。
The cities of Germany are absolutely free； they own but little country
around them； and they yield obedience to the emperor when it suits them；
nor do they fear this or any other power they may have near them；
because they are fortified in such a way that every one thinks the
taking of them by assault would be tedious and difficult； seeing they
have proper ditches and walls； they have sufficient artillery； and they
always keep in public depots enough for one year's eating； drinking； and
firing。 And beyond this； to keep the people quiet and without loss to
the state； they always have the means of giving work to the munity in
those labours that are the life and strength of the city； and on the
pursuit of which the people are supported； they also hold military
exercises in repute； and moreover have many ordinances to uphold them。
Therefore； a prince who has a strong city； and had not made himself
odious； will not be attacked； or if any one should attack he will only
be driven off with disgrace； again； because that affairs of this world
are so changeable； it is almost impossible to keep an army a whole year
in the field without being interfered with。 And whoever should reply： If
the people have property outside the city； and see it burnt； they will
not remain patient； and the long siege and self…interest will make them
forget their prince； to this I answer that a powerful and courageous
prince will overe all such difficulties by giving at one time hope to
his subjects that the evil will not be for long； at another time fear of
the cruelty of the enemy； then preserving himself adroitly from those
subjects who seem to him to be too bold。
Further； the enemy would naturally on his arrival at once burn and ruin
the country at the time when the spirits of the people are still hot and
ready for the defence； and； therefore； so much the less ought the prince
to hesitate； because after a time； when spirits have cooled； the damage
is already done； the ills are incurred； and there is no longer any
remedy； and therefore they are so much the more ready to unite with
their prince； he appearing to be under obligations to them now that
their houses have been burnt and their possessions ruined in his
defence。 For it is the nature of men to be bound by the benefits they
confer as much as by those they receive。 Therefore； if everything is
well considered； it wilt not be difficult for a wise prince to keep the
minds of his citizens steadfast from first to last； when he does not
fail to support and defend them。
CHAPTER XI
CONCERNING ECCLESIASTICAL PRINCIPALITIES
IT ONLY remains now to speak of ecclesiastical principalities； touching
which all difficulties are prior to getting possession； because they are
acquired either by capacity or good fortune； and they can be held
without either； for they are sustained by the ordinances of religion；
which are so all…powerful； and of such a character that the
principalities may be held no matter how their princes behave and live。
These princes alone have states and do not defend them； they have
subjects and do not rule them； and the states； although unguarded； are
not taken from them； and the subjects； although not ruled； do not care；
and they have neither the desire nor the ability to alienate themselves。
Such principalities only are secure and happy。 But being upheld by
powers； to which the human mind cannot reach； I shall speak no more of
them； because； being exalted and maintained by God； it would be the act
of a presumptuous and rash man to discuss them。
Nevertheless； if any one should ask of me how es it that the Church
has attained such greatness in temporal power； seeing that from
Alexander backwards the Italian potentates （not only those who have been
called potentates； but every baron and lord； though the smallest） have
valued the temporal power very slightly yet now a king of France
trembles before it； and it has been able to drive him from Italy； and to
ruin the Venetians although this may be very manifest； it does not
appear to me superfluous to recall it in some measure to memory。
Before Charles； King of France； passed into Italy； this country was
under the dominion of the Pope； the Venetians； the King of Naples； the
Duke of Milan； and the Florentines。 These potentates had two principal
anxieties： the one； that no foreigner should enter Italy under arms； the
other； that none of themselves should seize more territory。 Those about
whom there was the most anxiety were the Pope and the Venetians。 To
restrain the Venetians the union of all the others was necessary； as it
was for the defence of Ferrara； and to keep down the Pope they made use
of the barons of Rome； who； being divided into two factions； Orsini and
Colonna； had always a pretext for disorder； and； standing with arms in
their hands under the eyes of the Pontiff； kept the pontificate weak and
powerless。 And although there might arise sometimes a courageous pope；
such as Sixtus ＇IV＇； yet neither fortune nor wisdom could rid him of
these annoyances。 And the short life of a pope is also a cause of
weakness； for in the ten years； which is the average life of a pope； he
can with difficulty lower one of the factions； and if； so to speak； one
pope should almost destroy the Colonna； another would arise hostile to
the Orsini； who would support their opponents； and yet would not have
time to ruin the Orsini。 This was the reason why the temporal powers of
the pope were little esteemed in Italy。
Alexander VI arose afterw